Introduction
The central aim of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 is, in the words of its long title, "to promote an efficient labour market" (ECA, 1991 ) . Additional stated aims of the Act , are premised on three key themes: freedom of association, frẽedorn of representation and freedom of contract. These explicit objectives are accompanied by implicit aims. On the introduction of the Act, unionists accused the legislation's architects of having a hidden • agenda -the lowering of wages, particularly penal rates, and the exclusion of unions from the employment relationship. Meanwhile, the Act's supporters srressed the opportunities for individualism, communication and co-operation that the legislation promoted, and emphasised the newfound freedom for individual workers to detennine their employment conditions. Member of Parliament and Chair of the Labour Select Committee Max Bradford ( 1991: 1 7) stated that the Act had resulted in "unlimited opportunity for employers and employees to shape arrangements in their own workplaces". The Act's leading proponent, the Minister of Labour Bill Birch, stated that the new legislation "'signals a move from the old conflict industrial relations model to a new, co-operative relationship between employers and ẽmployees" (Birch, 1991: 7) . Similarly, Brook ( 1991: 8) contrasted New Zealand's previous industrial relations system "based on a view of employment relationships • Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington. This research was undertaken while the author was a Masters student at Canterbury University. The author would like to thank the organisers and delegates of the Canterbury branch of the New Zealand Nurses Association and Ian Whitelaw, Industrial Relations Manager, Canterbury Area Health Board for their time and co-operation. The author also gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Pat Walsh and Rose Ryan, who patiently reviewed earlier drafts of this paper, and the anonymous Journal referees for their helpful comments.
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Sarah Oxenbridge as inherently adversarial or exploitative" with the new system in which relationships are a matter of mutual benefit to employers and workers, and for this are fundamentally co-operative". However, the Act's critics
• t'lblt dais of the employment relationship is deficient, as it ignores the imbalance in the parties to a contract (Douglas, 1991; Harbridge, 1993; Scott, 1991) .
ftftft.-A•• to die rhetoric surrounding the Act's introduction, the main aim of the legislation is to mut11al co-operation between employers and employees, resulting in u•tp~ in the negotiation process and power to dete1anine wages and conditions. However 9 opponents argue that the Act promotes employment relationships where the opposite is the reality, as it tilts the balance of power in favour of employers and provides them with new freedoms to reduce wages and conditions of employment.
Less than six months after its introduction, the Employers Federation's labour manager claimed that "improved workplace communication and flexibility bad the Act's most notable success" as "staff and management were now able to talk to each other in ways not possible under a confrontational system" (Christchurch Press, 17/12191: 3). Similarly, the Federation's chief executive stated that the move to a system of labour relations was accelerating with "markedly less conflict than had predicted" (Marshall, 1992) . However, three years on from its introduction, conflicting views exist as to the extent of the Act's success in promoting closer workplace relationships between employers and employees. As Hughes (1992) notes, the frequent reporting of lockouts does little to support claims by the government and pressure groups that the Employment Contracts Act is about co-operation rather than confrontation. Similarly, the Department of Labour's recent survey of labour market adjustment under the ECA found that many employees were uncomfortable with the new environment of Labour, 1993) . The survey reported that employees' views on the extent of itnp:ovenaents in staff/management co-operation and communication and employee trust of were significantly different and less favourable than employers'. Among public sector employees for example, 45% felt that employee trust of mamgement had decreased over the last year, while 27% believed that co-operation between management and had decreased. In addition, case studies and reports of labour relations in the poat-ECA environment in the retail industry (Hammond, 1993; National Distribution Unioa, 1992) , the private and public health sectors (Hill and Du Plessis, 1993; New ZeaJIIIII Organisation, 1993) , and a number of service industries (Gosche, 1992) , have the tendency for employers to unilaterally deterntine wages and conditions without into bargaining with employees or their representatives. Moreover, a number of these studies draw attention to increasing levels of worker exploitation and of conflict employees and employers.
The purpose of the present study is to examine the process of collective bargaining In tight of the predictions of the Act's supporters and opponents. A series of propositions on these predictions were developed and tested in the context of collective e•nployment contract negotiations between Canterbury Area Health Board (CAHB) manaa and New Zealand Nurses Association (NZNA) regional organisers and which took place between May and November 1992. The case study J,tethod of was in which data from personal interviews, observation of the negotiation ~ and documentary sources was collected and analysed through content analysis. · interviews were conducted with NZNA regional organisers and the CAHB's indutrial Health Sector Bargaining   19 relations manager prior to and following the negotiation period. Eight of the ten days of contract negotiations were observed, as were two stopwork meetings where both parties addressed nursing staff. During adjournments, observation of the NZNA team took place in order to record interactions between team members. In addition, a number of documentary sources were examined. These inclucted newspaper and magazine articles, information bulletins distributed to members by the NZNA Canterbury branch and union central office, and miscellaneous documents such as CAHB memoranda to employees and memoranda between the negotiating parties.
Prior to setting out results, the paper will provide a brief overview of the research propositions and the context within which the negotiations took place. The research findings are presented in two parts; the first is a descriptive summary of the negotiation process, the second involves an analysis of the negotiation or bargaining processes in light of the research propositions.
Research propositions
Four research propositions were developed in order to test certain prẽdictions regarding the outcomes of the new legislation in the context of a set of collective employment contract negotiations. These are: first, that the ECA will lead to significant changes in the bargaining process; second, that employers will use the Act to achieve the "implicit" aims identified by its critics; third, that the Act will not provide employees with greater power to detennine their own employment conditions; and finally, that the Act will not lead to improved co-operation and communication between employers and employees.
In the period leading up to the Act's passage, it became evident that the only prediction that was consistently made by both critics and supporters of the new legislation was that the process of negotiating wages and conditions would change markedly. Consequently, the first proposition tests whether the collective bargaining process has changed, and if so, for what reasons. . The second proposition posits that employers will use the legislation primarily to achieve the Act's "implicit aims", particularly the reduction of wages and conditions and the exclusion of unions from the employment relationship. The third proposition predicts that due to the inherẽnt power imbalance between negotiating parties, the Act will not result in greater power for employees to deterrnine their employment conditions. Finally, while the Act's supporters praise the Act as a means of fostering communication and co-operation between employers and employees, opponents point to the emergence of a "conflict model" of industrial relations (Foulkes, 1992: 12) . Thus, a fourth proposition tests whether the Act will lead to improved communication and cooperation between employees and employers.
Health sector reform in New Zealand
In 1983, the Area Health Boards Act devolved public health activities previously carried out by the Department of Health to the regions, marking the beginning of the "rationalisation and regionalisation" of health funding and provision (Ashton, 1992: 149 rates (Luke, 1992) . The Ministers' directives reflected the Government's desire bargaining refortns in the public sector which would parallel private particularly the decentralisation of bargaining from national to enterprise or documents and the reductions in penal rates. The use of the Employment Co achieve these outcomes was favoured because the Government, as paymaster of health board workers, desired a reduction in State labour costs (Luke, 1992) . A 7 deficit was claimed as making reductions in state sector spending imperatiye.
directives met with a hostile reaction from health sector unions, who of "declaring war" on their members (Roth, 1992 The negotiations -a summary
On the first day of the CAHB negotiations, the employers tabled their claim and engaged in an opening address outlining the "unique set of circumstances" under which they were bargaining. Future health refonns, decreased funding, the Employment Contracts Act, and the flexibility achieved by private sector employers in the area of penal rates were all referred to. Consequently, the CAHB' s claim sought to achieve flexibility through reductions in penal and overtime payments and changes to working hours. In contrast, the NZNA claim retained current conditions of employment and sought a three percent wage rise. Additionally, the NZNA outlined a key element of its claim -the notion of workplace refonn -as an alternative strategy to cost-cutting. . The union advocate asserted that workplace reforrn would lead to improved service quality through the revision of work practices. Initially, the Board rejected the proposal, later accepting the notion and jointly fonnulating a memorandum of understanding with the NZNA which outlined both parties' commitment to the concept.
After four days of negotiations, joint stopwork meetings were held. Negotiations had reached a deadlock, and both parties wished to address the nursing staff to outline their respective positions. After presenting their claims, the two parties gave an overview of the negotiation process to date. Nurses expressed extreme anger towards management and members unanimously rejected the Board's proposed wage cuts. Talks resumed on day five with the NZNA stating that the anger displayed by members at the stopwork meetings served to reinforc· e their original strategy. However, the CAHB responded with a package which involved greater pay cuts than packages previously offered. In turn, the NZNA developed a package in which lump-sum "shift allowances" replaced penal rates, similar to packages developed by NZNA regional representatives during negotiations with neighbouring area health boards. In response, the CAHB offered a settlement which substantially lowered NZNA's proposed shift allowances.
Day six of negotiations followed the same course. Each side calculated and recalculated base rates and shift allowances (with increases in the base rate resulting in reduced shift allowances) in order to arrive at a package that the other party would find satisfactory. The NZNA fonnulated settlements that were close to "cost-neutral" (where the nursing budget was retained at its present level), while the CAHB tabled settlements proposing reductions in the nursing budget. The CAHB announced that they would not accept a cost-neutral settlement, and a mutual adjournment was agreed upon. On day eight the NZNA presented the CAHB with a roll-over of the expired award, giving away only one concession. Surprisingly, the CAHB responded positively, offering a package which the NZNA considered "more attractive" than any package offered yet. Both sides gradually started moving towards a settlement and offers back and forth resulted in agreement, with the employers meeting all union claims apart from slight reductions in penal rates. The parties arrived at a settlement they believed would be ratified, and stopwork meetings were held in order for members to ratify the contract. To both parties' surprise, the ballot showed overwhelming evidence of members' dissatisfaction with the offer; of I ,400 nurses who voted, 1 , 1 00 rejected the proposed settlement.
Foil owing the breakdown in negotiations, nurses were balloted on their intention to strike.
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The ballot resulted in 80 to 90 percent of all vetiaa ill Combined strikes were planned for five days in total, in which S,SOO area health boards were to take industrial action simultaMOusly. Taranaki Area Health Board, on the day before the first Area Health board applied for an interim injunction · the NZNA.. filed on the grounds that the association had not complied with and given proper strike notice, and its strike ballot bad injunction failed and nurses took strike action over two of the five days fJf Three sets of inforn1al talks were held by the parties on the days prior to strike action. The frrst two days of talks failed to reach wllile 1118 more productive and led to discussion of the issues to be resolved in the filll negotiation. Prior to final negotiations the NZNA developed a ia rates were refotinulated as shift allowances and were calculated as an hourly to ordinary time based on a nurse's grading. These hourly rates Ul&.l allowances originally proposed by the NZNA, which were bunp S'IIU varied by shift. They also differed from the previous system of • not proportionately related to the basic hourly rate in the way that penalproposal met with the CAHB' s acceptance, and negotiations proceeded Consequently, the fmal two days of negotiations followed the same negotiations prior to the breakdown, in which both teams calcnlated financial data in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory package.
The final settlement maintained the nursing budget at its current level (a settlement) with all monetary changes in penal rates channelled into a~'* 1.8 percent. During fmal negotiations the board had modified its moving away from a position of seeking a $3.4 miJJion saving, to being a cost-neutral agreement. The industrial relations manager explained that was because the negotiation period "was taking too long", and bcca11se "1be further strikes was not favourable". The settlement was fully ratified 1JJ stopwork meetings and the two parties began drafting the employment
Discussion
The negotiation process was analysed in light of the propositions outJird findings structured according to these four propositions. Thus, the first the extent to which bargaining processes have changed under the BCA, examines whether the CAHB used the Act to lower wages and exclude employment relationship. The third section investigates whether nur.a' their employment conditions has been enhanced by the legislation, while proposition that the Act led to improved communication and · management and nursing staff.
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Sarah Oxenbridge to charge nurses. However, whereas in award negotiations NZNA bargaining teams were composed of union officials with experience in negotiations, regional bargaining resulted in the involvement of teams of delegates who had little negotiating experience. Both the union advocate and CAHB' s industrial relations manager believed that this resulted in negotiations proceeding more slowly than in the past. However, the union advocate believed that delegate representation on the team was essential, as the delegates provided feedback at all stages of the process by gauging workplace opinion on proposed settlements and bargaining options. Delegates surveyed the workforce to assess the outcomes of ratification ballots, and measured the effects of the Board's proposals on the "average nurse" by calculating the impact of proposals on their pay packets.
Thus, it was found that the Employment Contracts Act has resulted in significant changes in the collective bargaining process. The Act's emphasis on the decentralisation of bargaining to the enterprise, or in this case, regional level, was evident in the present study. In addition, new ratification procedure requirements and the composition of the union bargaining team resulted in the negotiation process proceeding more slowly, and in a more uncertain manner, than previously.
Use of the Act to achieve its implicit aims
This study found that although to some extent the employer party was able to achieve those aims highlighted by the Act's critics (reductions in wage costs -particularly penal ratesand the exclusion of unions from the employment relationship), the final settlement was highly favourable for employees and the NZNA. Although the employer sought to exclude the NZNA as a party to the contract and reduce nurses' wages, it had little success in achieving either aim.
The central focus of the negotiation process was the restructuring of payment systems to match similar refonns in the private sector. Consequently, throughout negotiations the CAHB frequently compared the public health sector with private sector industries, in order to justify the proposed wage cuts central to their claim. board management repeatedly emphasised the "social change" taking place throughout New Zealand, maintaining that New Zealand was becoming a "Monday to Sunday society". The board's argument in favour of reducing penal rates was based on comparisons between the health sector and the retail sector. The board's advocate likened hospital operations to those of retail outlets. He argued that nurses were not exempt from changes taking place in other sectors of the economy, in particular the shift towards greater wage flexibility and changes to working hours, and asserted that such sentiments were widespread public opinion. The NZNA refuted the board's comparison between the health and retail sectors, highlighting the crucial differences between them. The union advocate argued that there was little basis for comparison, owing to the fact that customers for health services differ markedly from customers for consumer goods, and that hospitals are highly dissimilar to retail outlets as they operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The union advocate observed that it was the employer's freedom to negotiate penal rates downward that was the significant issue. Consequently, the board's proposal to reduce penal rates quickly became a sticking point in negotiations. By the conclusion of negotiations, the shift allowances eventually agreed upon were almost equivalent to the penal rates set out in the fonner award, and consequently few nurses experienced wage losses. However, these modifications to the payment structure fulfilled the Minister of State Services' directives, retaining penal rates by recalculating and renaming them. It is interesting to note that it was the union party who actively developed the new wage structure which finally met with the board's agreement. It seems that the union realised that if negotiations were to proceed further, the one barrier to be broken down was the Government's "ideological opposition" (Macfie, 1992: 24) to penal rates. The CAHB' s bargaining strategy centred around lowering penal rates and increasing base rates. Such a strategy provides management with the opportunity to create divisions between workers who work primarily penal hours and those who work ordinary hours by encouraging those who work weekday (nine to five) shifts to sign contracts containing high base rate increases. This results in a situation where such workers lose sight of the gains to be made from a unified stance and consequently, collective strength is reduced. NZNA bulletins to members stated:
NZNA supports Monday to Friday workers and their need for an increaw: in the base rate.
However this increase cannot come from fellow workers as a decrease in their wages is unacceptable to them. NZNA will continue to fight for more money for all nurses. The union team avoided confronting the difficult issue of whether the existing wage structure was fair, instead justifying the higher wages paid to weekend and night workers by constant references to the "unsociable hours" worked by these employees, and demanding wage increases for all nurses.
During negotiations the composition of the NZNA bargaining team led to the emergence of a division between delegates who worked weekend/night shifts, and those who were Monday to Friday workers. Whereas the advocate and the delegates who worked ordinary hours saw strike action as a "last resort", the weekend workers repeatedly advocated strike action. Throughout the negotiations, these team members constantly reminded the group of the central focus of the NZNA's bargaining strategy; that members had mandated that they would not take a cut in wages. It became evident that the delegates who were weekend/night workers had significantly more at stake than the other team members and were anxious to preserve their current wages and conditions. Team members wished to ensure that neither group ofNZNA members was disadvantaged by the final settlement, yet each had a vested interest in ensuring that there would be no reduction in their individual incomes. Thus, it became increasingly hard for negotiators to bargain for the status quo as "dollars and cents" issues began to dominate negotiations. The composition of nurses' pay packets (the proportion of penal hours and nonnal hours worked) varied widely, and consequently negotiators found it difficult to estimate the effects of proposals on individual nurses' pay packets to any degree of precision. The union team requested that the CAHB provide them with financial infottnation including projections of wage costs, breakdowns of total wage expenditure (into penal rates and ordinary hours), and infonnation on the proportions of workers working ordinary and penal hours. However the CAHB was reluctant to divulge such infonnation. Consequently. , union negotiators were unable to assess the validity of "ability to pay" arguments put forward by the board, and were also hampered in their efforts to develop a proposal which would not unfairly advantage one group of workers over another. In this study, the employer sought to negotiate waae rates, in line with similar bends in the private initially insistent that it had to make a four to alternative is jobs", the final settlement · t1a1t employer was unable to use the ECA to achieve Similarly, while the board sought to exclude trying to exclude them from the workplace retbDa contract, the union gained inclusion in both employee representative.
Employee power to detel'lllille
The contract negotiations between the two palties employees and their representatives. Initiall)', t1ut stance, threatening substantial reductiODs ill tile negotiations, the employees had all but their prior expectations. A number of favourable settlement that was reached. n...
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in negotiating the contract (as CAHB negotiators were bargaining with. multiple occupational groups simultaneously), effective strike action, the high degree of umty ~~ng the region's nurses (and hence the decreased likelihood of fragmented bargmmng arrangements emerging), and the fact that the employers' represenatives, in the opinion of the NZNA advocate, "were not as aggressive as they could have been".
It was acknowledged by both parties that nurses were a powerful occupational group in tertns of both the group's size, and the level of public sympathy they engendered.
Employee power to detern1ine employment conditions was enhanced by the Act's ratification procedures, which provided individual workers with the opportunity to detettnine bargaining outcomes. The ratification process enabled employees to calculate the effects of proposals on their wages and vote accordingly. Employees' rejection of a paclulge that had met with the approval of both negotiating teams showed that the ratification process had the potential to result in a situation whereby employee power to dictate the course and outcomes of negotiations overrode that of the union negotiators. However, in some instances ratification procedures can lead to unsatisfactory outcomes for certain employees in minority groups. · As a result of the ratification of a proposed settlement by the majority of employees during 1992 contract negotiations between the NZNA and the Otago/Southland Area Health board some nurses received pay cuts of up to $10,000 per year. Many nurses in the region were extremely dissatisfied with this outcome. Consequently, the nature of the ratification process means that union members who constitute a "minority" within a larger group of workers will often fmd their power to detennine their employment conditions reduced. Moreover, although the ratification process afforded employees greater power to detettnine their working conditions, it also placed restrictions on their representatives (as outlined earlier).
Decentralised bargaining led to variations in employee power between regions, as nurses in some regions were more willing to strike and were more unified than those in others. The ECA provides employers with the opportunity to use a "divide and rule" strategy, thus reducing employee power by fragmenting the workforce. Employers may encourage a climate of self-interest among workers by offering one group of employees a contract that they consider attractive, but which reduces the conditions of another group (or by approaching workers directly without the knowledge of their bargaining representative), resulting in a divided workforce. However, unity among nurses in the Canterbury region prevented CAHB management from pursuing such outcomes.
Furthettnore, the Employment Court's rejection of the board's application for an interim injunction to prevent strike action marked an important turning point in negotiations. The granting of the right for nurses to strike and the subsequent strike action itself signalled a swing in bargaining power towards the employees and their representatives. Successful strike action provided tangible evidence of the strength of unity between the region's nurses. The NZNA advocate stated that in tettns of bargaining power and resolve to strike, nurses in Canterbury were a lot stronger than nurses nationwide.
However, certain groups of workers were rendered powerless in detettnining their own employment condi~io~s.. During the course of negotiations the CAHB began employing new employees ~~ Individual employment contracts containing significantly less favourable wages_ and con~1t1ons than those of the existing workforce. In addition, casual nursing staff were 1ssued With new employment contracts containing substantially reduced wages and 28 Sarah Oxenbridge conditions, and were told by management that if they did not sign the contracts by a certain date they would be given no further work. The wages and conditions in both sets of contracts were based on the board's claim. The actions of CAHB management served to hasten the bargaining process somewhat, as the bargaining team were aware of the vulnerability of both groups of workers. These workers were highly reliant on a settlement by the negotiating parties in order to restore their wages and conditions to their previous level in the case of casual workers, and to bring about parity between the wages of new employees and existing staff. Hence, the union was aware of the fact that the longer it took to settle the contract, the longer these workers would be working under infeaior conditions. Although casual and new employees were eventually brought under the new contract settled, they were essentially powerless to determine their own conditions of work during the negotiation process.
This study found that in some respects, employee power to dete1n•ine employment conditions has increased, true to the rhetoric surrounding the Act's introduction. The Act's ratification procedures enabled individual workers to deteitnine bargaining outcomes through majority vote, and the high level of unity among the nurses · their collective power to dictate the course of negotiations. However, certain groups of workers who constitute a minority of the total nursing workforce may fmd that the ratification process actually obstructs them from influencing negotiation outcomes. In addition, the study found that vulnerable groups of workers such as casual and new employees were unable to detettnine employment conditions during the negotiation process.
Employee-employer communication and co-operation
communication between employees and employers (previously hindered by the intervention of unions) serves to strengthen the relationship between the primary parties to the employment contract.
However, this study shows that in some instances direct communication may in fact aggravate tensions between employees and employers.
As with the stopwork meetings, it became evident that the strike also served as a vehicle for the expression of nurses' anger. Ostensibly, workers were striking over the preservation of their employment conditions. However, it became clear from interviews with union organisers and NZNA team members, and officials' and members' statements to the press, that they were also striking over the health reforrns of recent years and all that they have entailed: conflict between management and health professionals, the axing of essential services, the lack of consultation with nursing staff, and the subsequent detrimental effects on patient care. Indeed, the union advocate stated that nurses' anger was such that nurses in a nearby region would havẽ taken strike action "even if they had got a rollover". The strike served as a means of venting anger and displaying unity, while ẽnabling the union to assert its bargaining power.
The NZNA team members communicated nurses' dissatisfaction to management and to the central union office. While award negotiations had excluded the direct input of nurses at a regional level, the present negotiations enabled workplace representatives to express their anger and frustration. In defense of penal rates, the delegates forcefully conveyed to the CAHB team the dysfunctional consequences of working penal hours. One delegate stated, "Your health suffers when you work nights. You don't get to see your family. I'm unwell because l'vẽ worked the last seven afternoon duties" (3pm to llpm). To which a fellow delegate added "This is what nurses are saying and it is fundamental to them". The decentralisation of bargaining improved the opportunities for ẽmployees to directly communicate with management, although it did not appear to improve co-operation between the parties.
Improved employer-employee communication may result if workplace refortn is implemented within CAHB hospitals.
However, the Act sets up constraints on implementing any such refonns due to health sector contract negotiations proceeding on a yearly basis, in line with the "hard budgets" set by management. The Act requires negotiating parties to ẽxpend substantial time and financial resources on preparing for yearly contract negotiations, resources that might otherwise be invested in developing initiatives such as workplace rẽfonn. Moreover, although CAHB management recognised the need for a mechanism to improve communication between management and employees, such a mechanism was not initiated by management, but by the union. Thus, contrary to the assertions of the Act's supporters that the new legislation will result in improved communication and co-operation between employees and employers, the relationship deteriorated over the negotiation period, to the point where nurses engaged in industrial action. However, as mentioned previously, nurses took industrial action due to a combination of factors, and consequently it is not possible to conclude that industrial action was taken solely on the basis of dissatisfaction with changes brought about by the Employment Contracts Act.
While the relationship between the CAHB and its employees deteriorated over the course of negotiations, it became apparent that the relationship between the union and its members (1992) organisation efforts are effective, who alloca18 ..., then1selves in enterprise issues beyond the baditioaal been less affected by the Employment Contracts Act te
High levels of on-site organisation (aided by the highly-trained and committed delegates, and the issues has resulted in a unified, powerful and contributed to union success in negotiations.
In direct contrast to predictions that the Act would. W a.
employers and employees, in this study eanployee eaaplaJ course of negotiations, with stopwork · apparent that increasing levels of conflict bet\YCI'D identify more closely with the union, which offered ~· of employment.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to document and in the Canterbury Area Health board under the study focused on a controversial sector, one in relations issues were intertwined, making for a highly It can be concluded that in this case bargaining under the Act. This is due to a combination of decentralised bargaining structures, and bargaining team compositions. Employee power to dete11nine employment conditions was enhanced for the majority of workers due to employee input in the ratification of contracts and bargaining teams, while certain minority groups of workers were unable to influence employment conditions. It was found that the Act does not foster communication and co-operation between employees and employers; rather, the opposite is more likely to occur. Consequently, low levels of communication and co-operation between employees and employers united union members, and stlengthened the employee-union relationship. In te11ns of the employer's use of the Act to achieve its implicit aims, ideological opposition to the notion of penal rates led to the development of a changed payment structure.
When asked to predict how trade unions would respond to the new industrial relations environment resulting from the ECA, Douglas (1991: 18) answered "Unevenly, in an evolutionary manner, on the basis of conflict and relative strength and in a changing way as events and experiences unfold". In the present study both parties had no alternative but to proceed in an evolutionary manner, as their course through the bargaining process was marked with hurdles and pitfalls set up by the new legislation. The parties learned by experience as they progressed through the negotiation process, in a similar manner to the bargaining parties in Walsh & Fougere's study of the frrst round of health sector bargaining under the Statẽ Sector Act (1988) . In their study, Walsh & Fougere (1989: 220) note that although the State Sector Act was conceived as an empowering agent for management... in other unexpected and unintended ways it also empowerẽd unions and hobbled management". A strikingly similar outcome was evident in this case study, as the union was empowered by certain provisions in the new legislation and by its members' cohesiveness. This study chronicles the impact of a changed institutional environment on the interactions between participants involved in the process of negotiating a collective en1ployment contract. It is hoped that this case study of bargaining under the Employment Contracts Act, essentially exploratory in character, lays a foundation for future case studies of contract negotiations in the health sector and in other sectors.
